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The ambitious Action Plan to be created by Canada and US leaders can avoid
failure if mechanisms are put in place to ease flows of trade and people
across the border – and protect individual rights. 
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICYThe leaders of Canada and the United States have announced an ambitious vision for
perimeter security and economic competitiveness between the two countries. They have
charged a working group with producing a multi-year Action Plan that will turn this vision
into reality. The vision is centered on the idea that performing inspection and other
formalities well before shipments and people arrive at the busy bilateral border will ease costly
delays there, and that this can be achieved while simultaneously enhancing security and
reducing costs for secure trade and for individuals.
Given the high degree of personal and trade interaction between the two economies requiring
frequent border crossings, the initiative makes sense. However, the Action Plan could be
derailed if it does not pay attention to overarching considerations such as protecting
individual rights and guarding against the misuse of confidential information. It may also
suffer from insufficient momentum if left to the vagaries of political attention. 
Given these considerations, the study proposes light joint mechanisms dedicated to making
the vision a success. They include: 
• a dedicated bilateral office, tasked with facilitating implementation of the plan, reporting to the two
federal governments but working in close cooperation with communities, agencies, sub-federal levels
of government, and legislators;
￿ an independent annual audit of security practices on both sides of the border, to provide joint,
evidence-based assessment of mutually acceptable levels of security;
￿ an annual independent audit of border-related practices, aimed at informing governments on the
effectiveness of resources dedicated to ensuring secure, efficient border passage;
￿ an ombudsperson with power to inquire about and prod agencies to redress misuse of information
collected and shared for the purpose of border security clearance; and
￿ a “single window” of information and assistance for small businesses and others, to reduce costs of
pre-clearance and traceability requirements. 
The study concludes that these new mechanisms can draw inspiration from existing ones that
help provide the mutual trust, dedication and expertise necessary to successfully manage
water issues between Canada and the United States.
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A
rare window of opportunity
exists for Canada and the
United States to enhance 
their policies and procedures relating
to their common border, to reduce
security risks, and to foster more
fruitful flows of commerce. This
window was opened on February 4,
2011, by Prime Minister Stephen
Harper and President Barack Obama
when they issued a joint Declaration
on a Shared Vision for Perimeter
Security and Economic Competitiveness
(United States 2011).
The two countries’ strategic interests in border
issues are strongly aligned. Both countries, of
course, want to keep cross-border security risks as
close to zero as possible, but since the 2008
recession, both have additional incentives to
increase the efficiency with which secure trade and
travellers can cross borders. For its part, the
United States has launched a drive to promote
exports, including through the removal of
unnecessary border and regulatory obstacles to
trade. Indeed, one of the surest signs that the
United States is seriously predisposed to
completing this initiative with Canada is that it
has undertaken similarly motivated initiatives with
other countries. Furthermore, Canada’s relative
economic strength makes it an attractive market
for US-based businesses. At the same time,
however, the fiscal discourse in both countries has
shifted decisively toward austerity, albeit in
combination with fierce resistance to increased
taxes. This means that there is a sharp focus in
both countries on efficiencies and cost savings,
including in border- and security-related agencies. 
Canada must seize this opportunity. Its exports
to the United States are tilted more toward
manufactured goods than are its exports to other
countries,
1 and Canada relies, in turn, on US
inputs for many of these exports. Modern
manufacturing requires secure, efficient, and rapid
passage across the border for myriad components,
often for the same good at different stages of
fabrication, as well as for the people involved in
making and selling these products. Easing the
border crossing also would improve the ability of
individuals to earn income by providing services as
diverse as nursing or machinery repairs, for example,
that might be needed in the neighbouring country.
The choice of the word “competitiveness” in the
declaration appropriately underscores the reality
that Canada and the United States make things
together, and that the two countries therefore
would derive enhanced value from being able to
do so less impeded by border friction. This is
especially relevant as trade barriers have been
coming down in other regions of the world, in
many cases enhancing their competitiveness
relative to that of Canada and the United States.
“Making things together” is also why, as the
declaration emphasizes, the two countries need 
to secure their joint critical infrastructure and
cyberspace, apart from their more direct contribution
to Canadians’ and Americans’ standards of living. 
The declaration evokes a “new long-term
partnership” and sets up a “Beyond the Border
Working Group,” reporting directly to the two
countries’ leaders, to develop a joint Action Plan
to realize the declaration’s goals. The Working
Group has been considering a long list of technical
ideas submitted by various groups and experts for
enhancing both security and ease of passage at the
The author thanks Philippe Bergevin, Stephen Clarkson, Laura Dawson, Michael Hart, Larry Herman, Finn Poschmann, and two
individuals who wish to remain anonymous, for formally reviewing and/or giving advice on all or parts of this paper. Responsibility for any
remaining mistakes lies with the author.
1 Excluding energy trade, which is overwhelmingly not affected by physical border inspection issues, Canada’s exports to the United States by
value are more likely to consist of finished manufactured goods than are Canada’s exports to other countries. This is mostly, but far from
exclusively, due to auto trade (Statistics Canada 2011, table 3-2, and author’s calculations).| 2 Backgrounder 141
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border. Many of these would build on or extend
the use of currently available programs and
processes. Nevertheless, the window of opportunity
to enhance security, facilitate mutually beneficial
trade, and reduce costs could close quickly in the
run-up to the 2012 US presidential elections.
Time is therefore of the essence.
For Canada, a major strategic objective must be
not only to secure a one-off reduction in costs
related to cross-border transactions, but also to
reduce the likelihood that future actions by US
administrations might increase those costs for
unwarranted reasons. Therefore, the Action Plan
needs to deal with the continued nurturing of a
trusted relationship, without which a perimeter
approach, inherently involving fewer checks made
at the physical border, cannot work. This,
presumably, is what the declaration means by a
“new long-term partnership.” Accordingly, in this
Backgrounder, I suggest that the partnership
requires novel sustaining bilateral mechanisms
dedicated to its success. To see what kind of
mechanisms are needed, however, it is necessary to
review the key substantive issues that should 
be addressed. 
What Needs to Be Done, in Short 
Let me begin by drilling down from the strategic
goals outlined above to some of the specifics of
what needs to be accomplished, and the main
sticking points associated with those specifics.
Ensuring that cross-border transactions occur at
minimal risk, consistent with the goals of Canada
and the United States, involves three types of
measures. First, it is necessary to move security-
related verification mechanisms and personnel
away from the actual border (an essential feature
of the “perimeter” concept), while simultaneously
improving the two countries’ abilities to distinguish
between secure and less secure shipments and
individuals potentially headed for the border.
Second, inspection at the border needs to focus
more on potentially high-risk movement and less
on secure shipments and individuals. This could
be done, by, for example, reducing unnecessary
regulatory differences, agreeing mutually to
recognize the result of each other’s inspections, or
increasing limits on duty-free cross-border
shopping. Third, infrastructure and the efficiency
of inspection at the border itself need to be improved.
These three classes of measures are uncontroversial
in principle, but need to be designed and
implemented carefully if they are not to run afoul
of overarching concerns such as the protection of
individual rights and privacy – which the two
countries’ leaders stressed in the declaration – as
well as of confidential commercial information
and the need for governments to raise revenues
efficiently to cover program costs. More prosaically,
such measures should not be permitted to run
aground because of bureaucratic or other vested
interests seeking to maintain the status quo.
Identifying Security Risks Away from 
the Border
The reality of the perimeter concept embodied in
the first class of measures is that the Canadian
authorities will have to treat certain activities or
persons that the United States considers risky, but
that Canada might not, differently from those
neither country considers as posing a risk. Ideally,
this different treatment will affect “risky” activities
or persons only insofar as they interact with US
territory or persons, and not how they go about
doing business in Canada with Canadians, or
affect legal trade or movement of people between
Canada and third countries.
In practice, however, given that the application
of a “perimeter” concept necessarily involves each
country’s authorities watching out for the security
of the other in dealing with shipments or residents
from third countries, Canada and the United
States will have to assess jointly security risks
attached to specific activities or individuals. And,
from each country’s viewpoint, the acceptable
level for risks coming from or through the other
most likely cannot be lower than what it is
prepared to tolerate, on its own, vis-à-vis third
countries. Such exercises in joint risk assessment
and joint action in the face of risks are fully inBackgrounder 141 | 3
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keeping with a tradition in Canada-United States
relations requiring the two neighbours to “watch
each other’s backs” that dates at least to the 1940
Ogdensburg Declaration and the creation of a
Permanent Joint Board on Defense. This tradition
involves each country’s exercising its sovereignty in
a way that maintains an agreed-upon common
public good – security – which can best be
obtained by their working together to minimize
risks to one or the other, or to both countries.
This does not mean the two countries need to
adopt the same security measures, but they must
pass the grade in terms of each other’s security
assessments, despite differences in their laws,
institutions and procedures. Indeed, joint threat
assessments should rely on risk analysis that is
sophisticated enough to take into account that the
two countries will not necessarily address risks in
the same way. Where relevant, the two countries
should also stress the compatibility of their joint
threat assessment processes with multilateral
processes, such as the United Nations’ “no-fly” list.
At the same time, Canada should take care that
required restrictions on travellers and shipments
rest on evidence-based, non-politically motivated
assessments of risk and do not affect fundamentally
Canada’s relations with third countries, with
whose nationals Canadians might wish to interact
in the normal course of business or personal
matters. The two countries accordingly should
reach an understanding that a restriction by one
country, on national security grounds, on a third-
party investor, does not automatically entail a
similar restriction in the other country, but rather
triggers an evaluation designed to ensure that an
acceptably low level of risk ensues despite the two
countries’ different stances.
Furthermore, long-term trust between the two
countries ultimately requires trust not only
between their two governments, but also on the
part of legislators and the general public. In this
regard, it is important to reassure the US
Congress, in particular, that the Canadian border
is secure in order to avoid unexpected and
unnecessary restrictions thrown at Canada based
on poor information. A mechanism is also needed
to query and, if necessary, adjust the other’s
assessment of cross-board threats, with input from
legislators, relevant agencies, sub-federal
governments where appropriate, and the public. 
An integral part of establishing a deeper level of
trust between the two countries, so essential to the
success of the perimeter concept, is that the public
should trust that restrictions applied for security
reasons do not trump individual rights, or rights
to privacy or confidentiality, without due process,
at least in non-emergency circumstances. Canada
needs to be transparent about the type of
information it intends to share, why it is relevant
to addressing security concerns, and what
assurances there are that the information shared
will not exceed what is necessary or be misused.
2
These considerations call for annual, independent
audits of Canadian and US security programs,
processes, personnel, and infrastructure to ensure
that they meet both countries’ standards of risk
tolerance. The audit reports, certifying the
adequacy and equivalency of security measures –
or, if not, identifying specific flaws – should be
delivered to legislators in both countries and
ideally be endorsed by them. In effect, the audits
would act as a “security certificate” that should
ensure that security is adequate and that it is seen
as adequate. Legislators should have an opportunity
to question the auditors and express any
reservations or concerns about the report. In
addition, the president and the prime minister
should name an ombudsperson to whom
individuals and firms mistakenly sanctioned can
swiftly refer their cases for inquiry – and, if
warranted, attempt to obtain reversal of
unjustified decisions. 
2 Authoritative views on how concerns about privacy and the misuse of information can best be handled, in the context of the collection and
exchange of information required to ensure adequate border security, can be found in Callahan (2010) and Office of the Privacy Commissioner
of Canada (2011).| 4 Backgrounder 141
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Within this context of trust, it should be possible
for Canada and the United States to proceed with
cost-reducing measures at the border itself, such as
an integrated entry-exit or “swipe once” system,
whereby entry in Canada serves to document exit
from the United States, and vice versa. The two
countries also should be able to adopt or expand a
range of preclearance measures away from the
border, facilitated by technology, whereby,
sometimes operating jointly, they enable the early
detection of risk in the movement of people or
goods, as well as risk in other areas, such as
cyberspace, that originates within their jurisdictions
or in other countries.
3
Focus on Potential High Risks, Facilitate
Secure Movements 
The concept of trust within the perimeter does
not apply only to security issues, narrowly defined,
or to criminal activities more broadly speaking. It
is also enbedded in the regulatory agenda through,
for example, more frequent calls for requirements
to make products and shipments traceable, to
ensure conformity with existing safety, health, and
other standards, thus intimately linking the first
two classes of measures. To that end, the two
governments have also set up a Regulatory
Cooperation Council, to work toward reducing
unnecessary differences between the two countries’
regulatory regimes (Canada 2011). If successful,
this cooperation could spur trade by minimizing
the need for firms to produce and ship goods that
meet different standards for markets in the two
countries. From the perspective of more efficient
border management within a perimeter concept,
the key is to reduce the number of inspections in
areas where regulatory equivalence (or convergence),
or at least equivalence in testing and inspection
procedures, can be established. The relevant
agencies in each country then could accept more
easily the results of the other country’s testing 
and inspection, which, in turn, would reduce 
costs to businesses and permit fewer inspections 
at the border.
Although the bilateral regulatory agenda is
ambitious and focused on reducing the cost of
doing business across the border, businesses will
still have to meet an array of regulations for their
products or services to be approved for sale in the
other country. Indeed, the two countries’ security
and regulatory agendas are evolving toward
increasingly sophisticated traceability requirements
involving the greater use of technology and the
collection of information through the supply chain.
This risk reducing the benefits of the drive to
simplification through “inspected once,” “tested
once,” or “swipe once” systems. The next task,
therefore, is to ensure that the regulatory costs of
conducting cross-border transactions are not
simply pushed away from the border and added to
costs for businesses and travellers elsewhere within
the perimeter. Thus, the overall burden of cross-
border transactions should be reduced with a view
to increasing the potential for small businesses –
whose growth within continental and global value
chains might well form the backbone of a North
American manufacturing renaissance – to trade
more easily across the border. Small businesses
that are unable to piggyback on the security-
related processes that larger suppliers or bulk or
container transporters can afford more easily –
allowing them swifter passage at the border –
should have access to an alleviating mechanism
that allows them to verify that they are meeting
security and regulatory requirements, and that
helps them meet those requirements. It makes
sense to ensure that, for both small and large
businesses, compliance costs do not outweigh the
benefits of new initiatives.
3 The concept of preclearance resonates well in both Canada and the United States, and offers a range of possibilities for significantly
enhancing joint security, while reducing costs at the Canada-US border. For a detailed analysis of these possibilities, see Hart (2010). Backgrounder 141 | 5
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A single “window” should be established
through which smaller businesses on either side of
the border could ascertain their compliance
requirements, what steps they need to take to
ensure compliance, to obtain preclearance for
their shipments or people, and to ensure
reasonably fast solutions to bureaucratic problems.
4
Such a window could use as its inspiration the
model of integrated services for residents already
provided in some US or Canadian jurisdictions,
such as Service Ontario. Ideally, over time, the
widespread application of one-time inspection,
testing and swiping systems could lead to a single
border form that provided for information that
either country requires. A self-funding trade
“accelerator” centre, within which smaller firms
could pool resources and exchange views and
experiences with government and larger firms on
how to facilitate border passage, should also be
encouraged. And, while governments should
continue to push vigorously for harmonization of
their external tariffs and simplification of rules of
origin where this makes sense, they should also
consider special rules for small businesses, shippers
and shipments, based on the trustworthiness and
security clearance of business owners and their
employees, rather than on the filing of extensive
paperwork to prove conformity with complex rules.
People Movement
In economies in which trade and investment are
able to flow as easily as they do between Canada
and the United States, facilitating the temporary
movement of business visitors, traders (including
skilled workers) and investors, intra-company
transferees, and professionals can generate
additional value. Thus, the application of existing
provisions under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) should be reviewed as part
of the overall modernization of the two countries’
border arrangements, with a view to ensuring
smoother passage across their mutual border for
legitimate business-related trade.
As the NAFTA spells out, the temporary
movement of business people should not affect the
two countries’ permanent immigration and labour
market policies and arrangements or the need for
letters of employment or work permits in the case
of some temporary entrants. Instead, the two
countries should review and improve the
implementation of existing measures as they
relate, for example, to business visitors who
perform services directly related to cross-border
trade, and streamline information and paperwork
requirements more generally. A more ambitious
measure would see the two countries revising the
list of business visitors who are allowed temporary
entry. The applicable provisions of the NAFTA,
now almost 18 years old, date back to when, for
example, a number of Internet-based occupations
were in their infancy. The two countries thus
should launch consultations – that include the
provinces, states that trade heavily with Canada,
and professional and certifying organizations –
with a view to modernizing the list through, for
example, a temporary short-term stay program for
an additional set of professions. 
Enhance at-the-Border Efficiency 
A third class of measures concerns the border
itself. The basis of improvements in costs and
waiting times at the border is embedded in the
agenda of the first two classes of measures, which,
when completed, will ensure that only inspections
that must be made at the physical border take
place there. Nevertheless, much remains to be
done to ensure quicker passage at the border,
including removing impediments to the take-up
of existing preclearance programs, finding
mechanisms to facilitate the building of
4 A recent report from the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB 2011) suggests in a similar vein that border-related information
relevant to small businesses be more accessible, that contacts be provided to respond to questions, and that a one-stop web portal be created
that contains relevant information.| 6 Backgrounder 141
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economically and environmentally sound transport
infrastructure, and ensuring that border personnel
focus on security and crime prevention rather
than on the collection of taxes and fees. While it is
reasonable for governments to collect fees for the
services provided by agencies that administer the
border, or taxes on cross-border purchases, a one-
stop e-window – including perhaps a revenue-
sharing formula between jurisdictions such as
already exists for trucking licences – rather than
collection at the border, should be contemplated
as a means for doing so, including for individual
cross-border purchases.
External auditing of border infrastructure and
practices should prioritize, identify, and reduce
key infrastructure and administrative bottlenecks.
Such auditing would monitor the efficiency of
border crossing and help governments, through
public discussion of the auditors’ reports, allocate




Any program commensurate with the aspirations
Prime Minister Harper and President Obama
expressed in the February 4 declaration constitutes
a tall order. Indeed, what is promised now is a
multi-year Action Plan to be endorsed and put
into motion by the two governments by the end
of 2011. Experience, however – such as that of the
Security and Prosperity partnership (SPP), launched
by the three North American heads of government
in 2005 but which became inactive in 2009 –
shows that ambitious and detailed programs can
wither on the vine from lack of ongoing political
interest, not to mention public skepticism, 
which, in turn, can lead to administrative apathy
for reform. This phenomenon has also affected
the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and
NAFTA, both of which had embedded in them
possibilities for evolution over time that were
never fully exploited.
Political leadership is important in setting goals
and launching the partnership, and ultimately will
be responsible for measures taken under the
Action Plan. Nevertheless, implementation of the
plan and the management of the border in normal
times should not be left to the vagaries of political
attention. Furthermore, while agencies on both
sides of the border have a long history of successful
cooperation, there is a natural tendency for them
to preserve their authorities and ways of doing
things, and therefore they are not candidates for
promoting change without external, authoritative
prodding and monitoring.
While the Beyond the Border Working Group
will continue to oversee through the implementation
of the working plan over the next three years, a
slim, dedicated bilateral office or commission
should be set up to pursue the overarching
commitment resolving coordination issues as they
arise, in fulfillment of the leaders’ declaration.
Indeed, the demise of the SPP showed that the
process can be derailed by a combination of public
hostility and indifference or misunderstanding. 
A mechanism to give the public a window on and
a way to inform the process is necessary to the
success of an entreprise that will rely as much on
“bottom-up” cooperation between Canadian and
US entities, communities and the public at large
as on “top-down” plans by governments. A joint
office or commission could perform this important
consultative and informational role, in support of
the responsibility ultimately exercised by
governments and agencies on cross-border matters.
Since the work of such an office or commission of
necessity would involve the public and legislators
from the northern US states, it could also be an
important locus of political support in Congress
for a secure, yet more open border.
Fortunately, experience with previous Canada-
United States cooperation – in particular, the
International Joint Commission and the recent
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water
Resources Compact – provides inspiring and
workable models on how to go forward. These
international agreements allow a role for localBackgrounder 141 | 7
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government, agency, expert, and public input in
providing evidence-based recommendations to
government and agencies on complex cross-
jurisdiction problems that also transcend the
mandate of any one agency or department. 
The success story of the Canada-United States
relationship is steeped in these and other cross-
border collaborative processes. A similar process
for managing and invigorating cross-border
economic and security cooperation would provide
the required input and evidence-based
recommendations, as well as the credibility,
transparency and accountability, that would
cement the key element of the relationship at and
beyond the border: trust.| 8 Backgrounder 141
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